On the verse, [183] "Is a man a tree of the field?" the Sifri comments: "This teaches that a person's life is dependent solely on the trees."
On the surface, this statement is difficult to understand, for humans derive their sustenance from many foods, and not only those that grow on trees.
This difficulty can be resolved based on the following concepts. In Likkutei Torah,[184] the Alter Rebbe interprets the verse:[185] "Bread satisfies the heart of man," to mean that bread satisfies one's appetite more completely than other foods. A person may also eat meat, but it will not sate his hunger the way bread does.
The reason why entities from the inanimate, plant, and animal kingdoms can provide food for humans, although humans are a higher form of life, is because those entities which have a higher source descend to a lower plane of existence. Therefore, man derives his food from the lower forms of life, because they have a higher spiritual source.
The lower the form of life, the higher its source. Since the plant kingdom is lower than the animal kingdom, plants have a higher source than animals. So it is that bread, which stems from the plant kingdom, satisfies far more than meat which comes from the animal kingdom. (For this same reason, the kosher members of the animal kingdom themselves derive their sustenance from the plant kingdom.)
On this basis, we can appreciate the Sifri's statement that a person's life is dependent solely on the trees. As mentioned above, it is the plant kingdom which provides mankind with its greatest degree of satisfaction. Within the plant kingdom itself, it is the trees which manifest the potential for growth to the greatest degree.[186] Therefore, the Sifri states that our lives are dependent on the trees.[187]
The Talmud states: [188]
What is the meaning of the verse: "Is a man a tree of the field?" Is a man, indeed, a tree of the field?
The intent [becomes clear as the passage continues]. It is written:1 "From it you shall eat; you shall not cut it down." And it is written:[189] "You may destroy [the tree] and cut it down."
What is implied? If one is a proper Torah scholar, one may eat (i.e., study Torah)[190] from him and one should not destroy him. If not, one should destroy him (i.e., abandon him).
The Talmud implies that a person is compared to a tree; it is not merely that he derives his sustenance from trees. Although at first the comparison raises questions, a likeness between the two is ultimately established.
Yet this passage is problematic:
- Why does the Talmud question the comparison between a person and a tree at the outset? There are, after all, several aspects in which a likeness between the two is apparent. Indeed, the Mishnah[191] itself draws a comparison between man and a tree.
The force with which the Talmud asks this question indicates that it considers the likeness between a man and a tree as complete, and not merely a comparison involving several particulars. It appears that the Talmud sees man and trees as the same.
If that is the intent, however, the resolution offered by the Talmud -- that there is a way in which a person can be compared to a tree -- is difficult to accept. Why is this facet more significant than the other characteristics by which a person can be compared to a tree?
- The Talmud's answer mentions a Torah scholar, while the verse speaks about mankind as a whole. How can a comparison to a Torah scholar be appropriate for all men?
- What is the connection between the interpretation of the Sifri mentioned previously and that of the Talmud?[192]
Every person is described as "a world in microcosm." [193] Thus everything that exists within the world at large has its parallel within the world of each individual. Just as the world at large is divided into four categories: inanimate matter, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, and mankind, so too there are parallels to each of these four forms of existence within man.
With regard to the plant kingdom, it is explained that the parallel within our human framework are the emotions.[194] For the emotions grow from an underdeveloped state to a developed state.[195]
A man's advantage over an animal involves his intellect.[196] Although the parallels to the three forms of existence -- inanimate matter, the plant kingdom, and the animal kingdom -- as they exist within man are far more elevated than these forms as they are found in the world at large,[197] this does not constitute the advantage possessed by man. Man's advantage is his ability to think.
This is the meaning of the Talmud's question: "Is a man, indeed, a tree of the field?" Our Sages understood that within man there exists a parallel to the plant kingdom, the realm of emotions. But is this man? Does this constitute the uniqueness of humanity?
The question is reinforced based on the well-known distinction regarding the four Hebrew terms used for man:[198] adam, ish, gaver and enosh. Adam, the term used in the verse under discussion, is associated with our intellectual capacity,[199] and represents the highest of these four levels.[200] This then is the Talmud's question: "Is an adam, indeed, a tree of the field?" Are the emotions the epitome of humanity, for which reason mankind has been given the name adam?
The Talmud responds, explaining that the ultimate purpose of the intellect is to affect the emotions and cause them to follow the intellect's prompting. This reflects a stage of fulfillment in an individual's striving for personal development.[201]
Intellectual prowess in itself does not reveal anything about personal development. The goal is that one's understanding should affect one's heart, as implied by the verse:[202] "Know this day, and take unto your heart that G-d is the L-rd." After knowing, one must take one's thoughts to heart.
The Talmud communicates this concept by employing the analogy of a tree. Just as the advantage of a tree is the fruit it provides,[203] so too an adam, a person identified with knowledge, a Torah scholar, must provide fruit. When can we recognize a Torah scholar as "proper"? When his intellect affects his emotions, which in turn invigorate his observance of the mitzvos, a process which our Sages describe[204] as "bearing fruit."
Man, the world in microcosm, resembles the macrocosm, the world at large. In the world at large, mankind derives its sustenance primarily from the plant kingdom, because the plant kingdom has a higher source than mankind. Nevertheless, plants today exist in a fallen state, and must be elevated by mankind. Once a man performs such an act, because of its higher source, the plant provides the man with sustenance and energy.
Similar concepts apply with regard to the relationship between intellect and emotion. The source of the emotions is higher than that of intellect.[205] Nevertheless, in their present form, the emotions are on a lower level and the intellect must elevate and refine them. Once this process is complete, the emotions can in turn lift the intellect to a higher level, allowing it to attain fulfillment. As mentioned previously: "Know[ing] this day," should lead to "tak[ing] unto your heart."
On this basis, we can appreciate the connection between the interpretation of the Sifri and the interpretation of the Talmud. Both are motivated by the same concept: that the plant kingdom can lift the human kingdom to a higher level. The Sifri, however, speaks about the macrocosm, the relationship between the plant kingdom and mankind, while the Talmud highlights how this relationship is reflected within the individual world of every person.
There is a deeper aspect to the above concept. Intellect represents the advantage of mankind over the animal kingdom, the crux of our humanity. Accordingly, just as all four types of existence: inanimate matter, the plant kingdom, the animal kingdom, and humanity, are included within man, so too, parallels to these four levels exist within our intellect itself. [206] There is an aspect of intellect that resembles inanimate matter, one that resembles the plant kingdom, one that resembles the animal kingdom, and a uniquely human dimension.
This relates to the four terms for mankind mentioned previously. For example, ish refers to the aspect of intellect that relates to the emotions.[207] Adam, by contrast, refers to the essence of intellect -- abstract understanding that is above all connection to emotion.[208]
This is underscored by the Talmud's question: "Is a man, indeed, a tree of the field?" The Talmud understands that "know[ing] this day," should lead to "tak[ing] unto your heart." On the surface, however, this can be accomplished by the element of the intellect which relates to the emotions, the level associated with the term ish. Seemingly, the essence of intellect, the level associated with the term adam, is above all connection to the emotions.
The Talmud resolves this difficulty by referring to the phrases: "From it you shall eat; you shall not cut it down," and "You may destroy [the tree] and cut it down." To explain the analogy: Fruit grows from the flowers that sprout from a tree's branches, not from the trunk of the tree, and certainly not from its roots. (For the trunk and roots refer to higher levels, planes too elevated to produce fruit.)[209]
Nevertheless, in order for branches to produce fruit, the trunk and roots are necessary. Thus it can be said that the trunk and roots exist for the sake of the fruit. For this reason, the Torah states that a tree which does not produce fruit should be cut down.
Similar concepts apply with regard to our personal world. The essence of our intellect is above any direct connection to emotion. Nevertheless, the essence of our intellect should affect the functioning of our emotions; indeed, it has a more powerful effect than does the dimension of intellect directly associated with the emotions. In the final analysis, it can be said that the essence of the intellect exists in order to change one's emotional makeup.
There is a twofold advantage of the influence which the essence of intellect has on the emotions over the influence exerted on the emotions by the aspect of intellect related to the emotions:
- Since the aspect of intellect which relates to the emotions considers emotion a significant entity, it is possible for emotions to obscure the light of intellect. When a person's heart is dull and insensitive, his thoughts will not influence his feelings.[210]
With regard to the essence of intellect, by contrast, it is impossible for the emotions to veil it, and it shines through to the heart.[211]
- Even when the intellect which relates to the emotions influences the emotions, it does not transform them. Since the emotions are significant in relation to this level of intellect, it can refine them, but does not change their fundamental nature.
The essence of intellect, by contrast, can change the very nature of the emotions. Indeed, this is the ultimate purpose of intellect. [212]
A similar comparison can be made between the study of Nigleh, the revealed dimension of Torah law, and P'nimiyus HaTorah, the Torah's mystic dimensions. Nigleh is enclothed in concepts involving material reality. Therefore:
- It is possible that it will not refine a person. Thus our Sages say,[213] "If [a student of the Torah] is not worthy, the Torah becomes deadly poison for him."
- Even when the study of Nigleh influences the person who studies it, his natural tendencies and fundamental self-concern remain. For Nigleh was given with man in mind, that it be comprehended by mortal intellect.
With regard to P'nimiyus HaTorah, the opposite is true:
- P'nimiyus HaTorah will ultimately influence the conduct of everyone who studies it, as our Sages say:[214] "The light [within the Torah] (i.e., P'nimiyus HaTorah)[215] will return him to the good."[216]
- It changes a person's nature entirely, lifting him above his natural tendencies and self-concern.[217] Not only does P'nimiyus HaTorah refine a person's emotions, it changes the nature of those emotions.30
The above concepts reinforce the directive to "spread the wellsprings of your teachings outward," [218] producing a twofold lesson:
- There are those who protest: "Why must we spread the wellsprings outward?" "Everyone," they explain, "must be granted influence on their own level. For those on the peripheries, drawn water is enough, or the water of a mikveh. Why must the wellsprings themselves be used for those on the peripheries?
The answer is that the only way to affect those on the peripheries is to use the wellsprings. For these wellsprings never contract ritual impurity; indeed, they convey ritual purity to everything.[219]
- Others protest: Why must I be involved with the peripheries at all? Why can't I sit in my room and study P'nimiyus HaTorah? What connection do I have with those peripheries?
The answer is alluded to by the expression: "Spreading the wellsprings of your teachings outward." When do the wellsprings of P'nimiyus HaTorah become your teachings? When they are spread to the peripheries. If such efforts are lacking, the person himself will not appreciate them as wellsprings. [220] For as mentioned previously, the ultimate purpose of the essence of the intellect is that it become an active force, effecting a change in one's emotions.
(Adapted from Sichos Shabbos Parshas Beshallach, 5722)
 Notes: - (Back to text) Devarim 20:19.
- (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 39c.
- (Back to text) Tehillim 104:15.
- (Back to text) Thus I Melachim 5:13 states: "And he spoke of trees, from the cedar tree... until the hyssop." See also the maamar entitled Vayatzar in Toras Chayim, Bereishis, sec. 17.
- (Back to text) According to the opinion (Berachos 40a) that wheat is a type of tree, the statements of the Sifri can be simply understood. For this opinion holds that bread comes from a tree.
- (Back to text) Taanis 7a.
- (Back to text) Devarim 20:20.
- (Back to text) The parenthesis are based on Rashi's commentary to Taanis, op. cit.
- (Back to text) Avos 3:17. See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. IV, p. 1210, where this mishnah is explained.
- (Back to text) For as mentioned previously (see the sichah to Parshas Toldos in this series), all the interpretations of a verse are interconnected.
- (Back to text) Midrash Tanchuma, Parshas Pekudei, sec. 3; Tikkunei Zohar, Tikkun 69 (p. 100a). See also, Avos deRabbi Nosson, ch. 38; Koheles Rabbah 1:4; Zohar, Vol. I, p. 143b; Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. I, ch. 72; Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 5a.
- (Back to text) See Torah Or, p. 4a; Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 58a, Devarim, p. 95c.
- (Back to text) See the maamar entitled Vayatzar cited above, sec. 17ff.
- (Back to text) Therefore, all of man's activities, even those which appear to be petty and mundane, must be dictated by the intellect. It is not sufficient that the arousal of the emotions of love and fear be prompted by the intellect. Instead, even the actual performance of the mitzvos, for which it would be sufficient to arouse one's emotions, should come as a result of the intellect (see the maamar entitled Vayidaber, 5696, sec. 5).
- (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 58b; the maamar entitled Chavivin Yisrael, 5696. See also Tzofnas Paneach al HaTorah, the beginning of Parshas Korach.
- (Back to text) Zohar, Vol. III, p. 48a; the maamar entitled Chaviv Adam, 5700; HaYom Yom, entry, Elul 4. See also Midrash Shochar Tov 9:16; S'dei Chemed, Vol. I, Klallim, Maareches Alef, sec. 74.
- (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim, p. 25a; the maamar entitled Chaviv Adam, loc. cit.
- (Back to text) Zohar, Vol. III, p. 48a; Likkutei Torah, loc. cit.
- (Back to text) It is true that intellect reflects a man's superiority over the animal kingdom. But true intellectual superiority arises when the mind rules the emotions (the maamar entitled VaYisa Aharon, 5694, sec. 1).
- (Back to text) Devarim 4:39.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, Vayikra, p. 35c; see also the Sifri to Devarim 20:19, which emphasizes the importance of a tree's fruit.
- (Back to text) Sotah 46a.
- (Back to text) Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 58b.
- (Back to text) The maamar entitled Zos Chukas, 5673; see also Likkutei Torah, Berachah, p. 95c.
- (Back to text) For that reason, the name ish is not applied to a male until he reaches the age of 13. Although his emotional potential existed previously, his emotions are not affected by the modulating influence of intellect until that age (Peirush HaMilos of the Mitteler Rebbe, sec. 2).
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim, p. 25a, which states that the term adam is associated with the level of mochin digadlus, intellect so developed that it encompasses every element of man's conduct.
For this reason, the term adam is applied to the Jewish people alone, for the intellectual potential (nefesh hasichlis) of the Jewish people is far different from that of other nations. For although the intellectual potential of the Jewish people is also mortal, it is sensitive to the refinement and abstraction of spirituality (the maamar entitled Chaviv Adam, 5702, sec. 1).
- (Back to text) The trunk of the tree represents G-d's essence, the True Being. The branches which extend outward from the trunk represent the ayin that comes into existence from G-d's essence, the light which emanates from Him, and which has a genuine appreciation of its dependence on its source and is therefore utterly nullified.
The flowers which sprout from the branches represent the eyin which brings created existence into being, i.e., the ray of G-d's light which causes our world to exist. From the flowers come the fruits or, in the analogy, our created existence, which also looks upon itself as a yesh, an independent identity (the series of maamarim entitled VeKachah 5637, sec. 77).
- (Back to text) Moreover, since the aspect of intellect which relates to emotion does not alter the direction of the emotions, it is possible for the emotions to influence the intellect, and bend it in favor of the person's natural tendencies.
- (Back to text) See the maamar entitled BaYom HaShemini Atzeres, 5665.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Dibburim, Vol. I, p. 56a ff.
- (Back to text) Yoma 72b.
- (Back to text) The introduction to Eichah Rabbah; the Jerusalem Talmud, Chagigah 1:7.
- (Back to text) The gloss of Korban Eidah to the Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit. See also the sichah to Parshas Behaalos'cha in this series.
- (Back to text) On this basis, we appreciate the connection between the Talmudic passage under discussion and the setting in which it was taught:
Rav Yirmeya asked Rav Zeira: "Share with me a teaching [of Torah law]."
[Rav Zeira answered:] ""My heart is faint, and I cannot."
"Share with me a teaching of the Aggadah."
[He answered:] "This is what Rabbi Yochanan taught: 'What is the meaning of the verse: "Is a man a tree of the field?" '..."
Rav Zeira's heart was too weak to share a Torah thought, i.e., he was unable to reveal the light of intellect within his heart. So Rav Yirmeya advised him to share a teaching from the Aggadah, for the Aggadah {in which is implanted the teachings of P'nimiyus HaTorah (Tanya, Iggeres HaKodesh, Epistle 25)} has the potential to effect the heart even when it is weak. For this same reason, he chose this particular teaching, which focuses on the unique dimension of the essence of intellect, and by extension on P'nimiyus HaTorah.
- (Back to text) See Kuntres U'Mayon, Discourse I, ch. 3; Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, Vol. I, p. 85a.
- (Back to text) The answer Mashiach gave the Baal Shem Tov when he asked him when he would come (the celebrated letter of the Baal Shem Tov printed in Ben Poras Yosef, Ginzei Nistaros, and in an abbreviated form in Kesser Shem Tov and the Or HaTorah by the Maggid of Mezeritch).
See Sanhedrin 98a, which quotes Yechezkel 36:8 "Your branches will sprout forth and provide fruit...," and comments: "There is no greater [sign of] the end of the exile than this." The spiritual analog to this is found in the efforts to spread the wellsprings of Chassidus outward.
The reason why Mashiach used the analogy of wellsprings* to describe the teachings of the Baal Shem Tov can be explained as follows: The waters of a spring are always connected with their source. As reflected in the mishnah (Mikvaos 5:1): "If one caused a spring to pass over a pool and separated it [from its source], the waters are equivalent to a mikvah (a lesser source of purity than a stream)."**
Moreover, it is possible to say that the waters of the stream (while within the stream) are considered as the stream itself.
Based on this explanation, we can appreciate the hypothesis advanced by Tosafos (entry Shema, Bechoros 55b), that a spring conveys ritual purity only when its waters are flowing. Tosafos certainly accepts the law that states when water from a spring is separated from its source, it conveys ritual purity when collected. Why then would the fact that the waters are not separated from their source detract from the waters' status?
The explanation is that when the waters are connected to their source, they are not considered an independent entity, but as the stream itself. And it is possible to posit that a stream will impart ritual purity only when it is free-flowing, and not when its waters are collected.
(To cite a parallel: Bikkurim 3:1 relates that Rabbi Shimon maintains that the designation of fruit as bikkurim applies only when the fruit has been detached from its source. While still attached, it is considered part of the field and not an independent entity.)
On this basis, we can understand the opinion of the Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Isurei Mizbeach 4:7) that the fact that a person bows down to a stream belonging to a colleague does not cause its waters to become forbidden to be used for the water libation, although the Rambam agrees (op. cit.:6) that an animal that has been worshipped as a false deity may not be used as a sacrifice even if it belongs to a colleague.
The distinction between these two instances can be explained as follows: An animal belonging to a colleague cannot be offered as a sacrifice only because the worship caused it to be considered loathsome; it is permitted to accrue benefit from the animal. {This interpretation is necessary, for a person cannot cause an entity belonging to a colleague to be forbidden unless he performed a deed involving that entity (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Avodas Kochavim 8:1).}
The waters of a spring can never be considered "loathsome" because when the person bowed to them, they were not considered an independent entity; they were part of the stream. It is only when they were taken to be used as a libation on the altar that they become an independent entity.
{When, by contrast, a person bows to a stream in his own property, the stream and its water become forbidden. It is not only that they are "loathsome." For this reason, the stream and the water coming from it are forbidden and may also not be used by an ordinary person. (See the Lechem Mishneh to Hilchos Avodas Kochavim, loc. cit. Although Hilchos Isurei Mizbeach uses the term "unfit for a libation" rather than "forbidden" with regard to such water, that is because the context involves sacrificial offerings.)} See Tzofnas Paneach, Mahadura Tinyana 30a.
Similar concepts apply with regard to the teachings of Chassidus. One of the fundamental elements necessary in spreading Chassidus is an ongoing, inseparable bond with the Nesi'im who teach Chassidus. This is expressed in the dedication to the exact wording used by the Nasi (see Sefer HaMaamarim 5708, p. 296). Indeed, the student who dedicates himself to spreading Chassidus should not see himself as an independent entity (from Sichos Yud-Tes Kislev, 5715).
* See also Megillas Yud-Tes Kislev, p. 30.
** Most authorities, including the Tzemach Tzedek, interpret this as referring to an empty pool. See the Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 164, sec. 2, based on the gloss of the Shach (Yoreh De'ah 201:30), quoting the Perishah, and also the comments of the Raavad in Baalei HaNefesh; R. Ovadiah Bartenura.
See also the Shaar HaMilluim of the Tzemach Tzedek to Mikvaos 5:6 (p. 37a). Note also the comments of Tosafos (Bechoros 55b), the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (as quoted by the Beis Yosef, Yoreh De'ah, loc. cit.). See also the sources quoted by Taharas Mayim (authored by Rabbi Nissen Telushkin), sec. 36.
- (Back to text) For, as stated in the conclusion of the first chapter of Mikvaos, a stream can purify all levels of impurity. Moreover, it is from it that water is taken for the ashes of the Red Heifer that remove even the impurity stemming from contact with a corpse, the most severe form of ritual impurity.
- (Back to text) Just as a mikveh is disqualified if the water flows outside the mikveh, so too a stream is not disqualified despite the fact that water flows outside its confines. For the definition of flowing water is not that it flows from place to place within the confines of a container, but rather that it flows outward. Indeed, even a mikvah is acceptable despite the fact that water flows from place to place within it (Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, Responsum 164, sec. 5ff.; Ramah, Yoreh De'ah 201:50).
Thus the power of a stream is expressed in the fact that it imparts ritual purity even beyond its confines. Moreover, as mentioned in note 36, there is a hypothesis that it is only when the water of a stream is flowing that it imparts ritual purity.
To cite a parallel, the Kessef Mishneh (gloss to Hilchos Shaar Avos HaTumah 6:15) states that a person does not attain ritual impurity until he emerges from a mikvah; while he is in the mikvah, he remains ritually impure. Similarly, one could explain that by spreading the wellsprings outward, the true power of the teachings of Chassidus is revealed. (A distinction can, however, by made. For with regard to the mikvah, it can be said that the emergence from the water completes the immersion.)
On the basis of the above, we can understand a statement made by the Tzemach Tzedek (cited in Likkutei Dibburim, p. 662; Toras Shalom, p. 169): "If my grandfather (the Alter Rebbe) had lived in the era of the Tannaim, he would have been a great Tanna. Had he lived in the era of the prophets, he would have been a great prophet. It is only because the generation was on a low spiritual level that these qualities were hidden." {Similar statements were also made with regard to Rabbi Yehudah HaChassid (Sefer Maasios).}
On the surface, the uniqueness of the Tzemach Tzedek's statement can be questioned. After all, our Sages have stated (Bereishis Rabbah 56:7): "There is no generation which does not have individuals like Avraham or Moshe." Nevertheless, the statement of the Midrash can be interpreted to mean that although in every generation there are individuals who possess a potential equivalent to that of the patriarchs and Moshe, that potential is not revealed. To refer to the analogy of a spring, the water does not flow outward.
For example, the potential of Rabbi Yehudah HaChassid remained primarily hidden. Although some of his directives were accepted throughout the international Jewish community, the motivating principles for these directives and his potential for prophecy remained hidden.
With regard to the Alter Rebbe, by contrast, he was able to enclothe even the most elevated of his potentials in his Chassidic teachings. By studying these teachings, it is possible for us to tap these potentials.
The Tzemach Tzedek's statement that these potentials were hidden can thus be interpreted to mean that they were not openly manifest, but rather enclothed within the teachings of Chassidus. Thus his potential can be compared to a stream which conveys ritual purity even when its waters flow outside its confines (Sichos Yud-Tes Kislev, 5715).
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