The Haftorah of Vayikra begins with G-d describing the Jewish people as "This nation whom I formed for Myself."
[1] G-d thus proclaims that all Jewish men, women and children, at all times and in all places, are unique in that we are His nation.
As the Haftorah reading is to be "in the spirit of the Torah portion,"[2] we must understand the relationship between the Haftorah and the portion Vayikra. Specifically, what is the connection between the opening words of the portion, "And He called to Moshe,"[3] to the first phrase in the Haftorah, "This nation whom I formed for Myself."
Additionally, why does G-d refer to the Jewish people as the nation whom He formed for Himself, rather than employing more commonly used expressions, such as "created" or "made"? And why does G-d allude to us here as His nation, and not as the Children of Israel or the like?
The fact that G-d considers the Jews to be His nation implies the essential relationship that exists between a king and his people. For a nation can be considered such only when it has a ruler, and a king can be a sovereign only when he has subjects over whom to reign.
Thus our Sages state:[4] "There can be no king without a nation." This means to say that the very sum and substance of a king - not only his majesty and glory - depends on having subjects. Consequently, G-d, as it were, is wholly dependent on the Jewish people in order for Him to be King.
Accordingly, even before a king issues decrees to his subjects there must be an essential relationship between the two. Only as a result of this association can the king issue decrees relating to the conduct of his people.[5]
The leading verse of the Haftorah also serves to inform us that being G-d's nation is not something that is subject to change, for it was brought about by G-d Himself - "This nation whom I formed." Just as He is immutable, so too are His choices.
As a result, after G-d gave the Torah (at which time the Jewish people accepted His sovereignty for all time), each and every Jew became a full partner in the Jewish nation, and thus caused G-d to be King, for "there can be no king without a nation."
In other words, anyone who was born Jewish or was properly converted needs no other qualifications to be considered part of "this nation whom I formed;" his essential relationship with G-d is not determined by his level of performance of Torah and mitzvos. In the words of our Sages:[6] "A Jew, although he sinned is still a Jew."
Although a king is incomparably loftier than his subjects, his subjects must be similar to him in some way, for only then can he reign over them. A human being, for example, can only rule over other humans and not over animals.[7]
This being so, one would think that any comparison, as it were, between G-d and the Jewish people exists only on the essential level of the Jew - where every Jew is "a part of G-d above,"[8] and where "G-d's nation is part of Him."[9] On a revealed level then, this could only take place when a Jew reveals this intrinsic level through his service of Torah and mitzvos.
The verse forestalls this error by stating "This nation whom I formed," rather than "created" or "made." By doing so it tells us that even the revealed form and shape of this nation and all its individual components are similar to its King. This is because G-d formed us "for Myself," so that even our revealed form would always be consonant with G-d Himself.
As a G-dly people, even the revealed form of the Jews is inherently G-dly, in keeping with the saying of our Sages[10] that the Jewish people have three natural identifying traits: "They are compassionate, demure and perform acts of loving kindness."
This loving relationship between G-d and the Jews is also alluded to in the opening words of Vayikra, where the verse says: "He called to Moshe" - "called" being an expression of love.[11] Moreover, the verse does not name who did the calling,[12] for G-d's call to Moshe and the Jewish people as a whole is from so lofty a level that it cannot be limited by a mere name[13] - similar to the relationship between "this nation" and "Myself."
Based on Sefer HaSichos 5750, Vol. I, pp. 378-384.
Notes:
- (Back to text) Yeshayahu 43:21.
- (Back to text) Tur and Shulchan Aruch (so too Shulchan Aruch Admur HaZakein) Orach Chayim, beginning of Section 284; Tur and Rama ibid., end of Section 428.
- (Back to text) Vayikra 1:1.
- (Back to text) Bachya, Vayeishev 38:30 and beginning of Balak; Kad HaKemach, Rosh HaShanah (2); Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, beginning of ch. 7, et al.
- (Back to text) See also Mechilta and Yalkut Shimoni on Shmos 20:3; Rashi, Vayikra 18:2.
- (Back to text) Vayikra Rabbah 2:2; see also Midrash Shmuel ch. 19; Sifri, Bamidbar 11:16.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar, p. 6b; Or HaTorah, Ha'azinu p. 1661; beginning of Zeh HaYom 5660, Adon Olam 5703.
- (Back to text) Iyov 31:2.
- (Back to text) Devarim 32:9.
- (Back to text) Yevamos 79a.
- (Back to text) Rashi, ibid.
- (Back to text) Likkutei Torah beginning of Vayikra.
- (Back to text) See Likkutei Sichos, Vol. VII, p. 24 and note; Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat, Vol. IV, p. 209.
The Torah portion Vayikra details various types of korbanos (sacrificial offerings), first relating the laws of voluntary offerings and then of obligatory offerings. Why does the Torah begin with free-will offerings; one would think we'd first be made aware of the laws regarding the korbanos that must be brought, and only then of the laws governing voluntary offerings?
The spiritual thoughts of the individual bringing an offering, rather than the offering itself, were always considered to be of primary importance.
Thus our Rabbis say about voluntary offerings:[1] "With regard to the [large] burnt offering of cattle, the verse states,[2] 'a pleasing fragrance to G-d.' So too with regard to the [puny] burnt offering of a bird the verse states,[3] 'a pleasing fragrance to G-d'....This teaches us that it matters not whether one gives a lot or a little, as long as his heart's intent is for the sake of Heaven."
The same was true with regard to the intention needed at the time an individual brought a sin offering. As the Ramban writes:[4] "When a person brings a sin offering he should realize that he sinned against G-d ... in His kindness, G-d substituted the animal in his stead." It is this thought that brings atonement.
In fact, one of the roots of the word karban is kiruv, drawing close, thereby indicating that the service of korbanos involves the drawing of one's faculties and powers closer to G-d.[5]
Since the person's intent is so crucial, the question arises: Why does the Torah seem to ignore the person's intent with regard to korbanos?
The answer lies in the fact that the Torah begins the laws of korbanos with free-will offerings rather than - as one might expect - obligatory offerings. By doing so it indicates that the most crucial aspect is the person's desire to come closer to G-d - "his heart's intent is for the sake of Heaven." And this aspect is most important regarding all korbanos, even those that are obligatory.
It can thus be said that all korbanos are to be considered free- will offerings, for at the crux of every offering are the feelings and intent of the individual bringing it.
In point of fact, the intention necessary for bringing korbanos is found within each and every Jew; when an individual brings a free-will offering, these latent intentions are merely revealed for all to see.
Thus, it is not necessary for the Torah to command this intent, for it is found in any case; bringing an offering will automatically reveal a Jew's innate desire to draw close to G-d.
The above explains an anomaly regarding korbanos: With regard to a free-will offering the Torah states: "he must offer it of his own free will."[6] In reconciling the seeming contradiction between "he must offer it of his own free will," the Gemara says:[7] "He is pressured until he says, 'I want to [bring the offering].' "
The Rambam explains this concept as it applies to a recalcitrant husband's "free will" issuance of a divorce:[8]
"Since he [the balking husband] surely wishes to act like a Jew, desiring to perform all the mitzvos and distance himself from sin, and it is but his evil inclination that has latched on to him, therefore, once he has been smitten to the extent that his evil inclination has become weakened and he says 'I want to [give the divorce],' he is surely issuing the divorce of his own volition."
And just as this is so regarding a Jew's intent while bringing an offering - even when he proclaims "I do not want to bring an offering," his inner desire is to bring one - so too with regard to all other aspects of his life. A Jew always desires and intends to be one with G-d, for as the Alter Rebbe states:[9] "A Jew neither desires nor is able to sunder himself from G-dliness."
Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XVII, pp. 9-13.
Notes:
- (Back to text) Menachos 110a.
- (Back to text) Vayikra 1:9.
- (Back to text) Ibid., verse 17.
- (Back to text) Ibid., verse 9; see also Seforno ibid., verse 2.
- (Back to text) See Sefer HaBahir 46 (109). See also Zohar, Vol. III, p. 5a; Shaloh, Misecteh Taanis (211b); Pri Eitz Chayim, Shaar HaTefillah ch. 5.
- (Back to text) Vayikra 1:3.
- (Back to text) Kiddushin 50a.
- (Back to text) Conclusion of ch. 2 of Hilchos Geirushin.
- (Back to text) See HaYom Yom, p. 73.
At the conclusion of the Torah portion of Vayikra,
[1] we learn about the Asham Talui, the sacrificial offering brought in a case of questionable guilt. The Gemara
[2] offers the following example: A person has before him two pieces of fat and eats one of them. Subsequently he finds out that one of the two pieces was not kosher, but does not know whether he ate the kosher piece or the non-kosher piece. In such an instance he is to bring an Asham Talui.
The Asham Talui is thus brought when a person's guilt is in doubt. This is in contrast to a regular sin offering, which is brought when a person definitely committed an unintentional sin. Logically, indubitable guilt should be treated more stringently than questionable guilt. Nevertheless, we find that the minimum value of the Asham Talui is 48 times greater than that of the minimum value of a regular sin offering.[3]
Why is this so?
Rabbeinu Yonah explains[4] that this is because the atonement gained through an offering is accomplished by the individual's repentance. When a person is sure he has sinned, his repentance will surely be whole and truthful. But when a person is in doubt as to whether he sinned at all, then it is necessary to seek a medium that will guarantee repentance. This is accomplished by having the offering cost more, thereby showing the person the importance of his accompanying repentance.
It would seem, however, that this reason does not suffice. While an offering had to be accompanied by repentance, the offering itself brought atonement and removed the taint caused by the particular sin. Evidently, the fact that an Asham Talui is much more expensive indicates that in some sense the taint of a questionable sin is greater than that of an incontrovertible sin.
How are we to understand this?
Generally speaking, sacrificial offerings atone only for those sins that were done inadvertently,[5] for even an unintentional sin needs atonement.[6] For though the sin itself was committed unwittingly, the fact that it was possible for the person to have sinned is an indication that he is spiritually lacking; were he to be spiritually complete he would not even sin inadvertently, as the verse states:[7] "A righteous individual will not happen upon iniquity."
Thus, inadvertent sin is a direct result of having allowed one's animalistic tendencies to get out of hand.[8]
Those things that a person does without thinking tend to reflect the things in which he is immersed, and where his true pleasure lies. The actions of a truly holy individual are good and holy; succumbing to evil - even inadvertently - is an indication that a person does not find his pleasure only in goodness.
Thus, in one way inadvertent sin indicates a greater spiritual taint than conscious sin: When a person does something wrong knowingly, his action does not necessarily indicate to what degree he is bound up with the evil; it is entirely possible that his sole connection was only at the time of the deed, and affects only his power of action and present level of intent. However, when an individual sins unconsciously and without premeditation, then his action indicates a subconscious connection to sin; evil touches him on a level that goes much deeper than his awareness.
Just as in one sense the taint of an inadvertent sin is greater than that of a conscious sin, so too questionable guilt is in a sense harsher than indubitable guilt: When one knows for sure that he sinned inadvertently, he will be remorseful. But when his guilt is in question he may think that nothing untoward has happened. This may indicate an even deeper level of evil, wherein the individual is utterly insensitive to it.
This is why the cost of the offering for questionable guilt, the Asham Talui, is so much more than for incontrovertible guilt, for the Asham Talui must eradicate a deeper connection to sin, thereby enabling the person to once again be whole and pure before G-d.
Based on Likkutei Sichos, Vol. III, pp. 942-946.
Notes:
- (Back to text) Vayikra 5:17-19.
- (Back to text) Kerisus 17b.
- (Back to text) Zevachim 48a; Tosafos titled Michlal in Tractate Kerisus 10b.
- (Back to text) Berachos 1b. See also Shulchan Aruch Rabbeinu HaZakein, Orach Chayim, ch. 603.
- (Back to text) Iggeres HaKodesh, Epistle 28. See also maamarim titled VeChal Adam of the Tzemach Tzedek and of the year 5723.
- (Back to text) Rashi, Shavuos 2a titled Toleh.
- (Back to text) Mishlei 12:21.
- (Back to text) See Iggeres HaKodesh conclusion of Epistle 28; Tanya, ch. 13.
Vayakhel-Pekudei