Adapted from Likkutei Sichos, Vol. XIX, p. 348ff.
The Talmud states:
[1]
It has been taught: Rabbi Eliezer declares: "A person cannot fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival [of Sukkos] with a lulav that belongs to a colleague, for it is written:[2] 'And you shall take for yourselves on the first day, the fruit of a beautiful tree...,' i.e., [these species must be] your own. So too, a person does not fulfill his obligation [using] a sukkah that belongs to a colleague, for it is written:[3] 'You shall celebrate the festival of Sukkos for seven days for yourselves,' i.e., [the sukkah] must be from your own...."
Our Sages [differ,] saying: "Although a person does not fulfill his obligation on the first day with a lulav that belongs to a colleague, he may fulfill his obligation [using] a sukkah that belongs to a colleague, for it is written:[4] 'Every citizen of Israel shall dwell in sukkos.' This[5] teaches that all of Israel are fit to dwell in a single sukkah."
What concept do our Sages derive from [the phrase] "for yourselves"?[6] They require it to exclude a stolen [sukkah]. A borrowed sukkah [is, however, acceptable, for] it is written: "Every citizen...."
The halachah follows the Sages' approach, and thus on the first day, a person does not fulfill his obligation with a borrowed lulav.[7] With regard to a sukkah, by contrast, a person may fulfill his obligation with a borrowed sukkah.[8]
From a simple perspective, the Sages' opinion can be explained as follows: The exegesis of the verse "Every citizen..." comes to teach us that although it is written: "You shall celebrate the festival of Sukkos... for yourselves," the intent is not that one must own the sukkah,
[9] but rather that a person cannot fulfill his obligation in a stolen sukkah.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav, however, offers a different interpretation, stating:[10]
Although the Torah says: "You shall celebrate the festival of Sukkos... for yourselves," i.e., [the sukkah] must be your own, and may not belong to a colleague. Nevertheless, a person may fulfill his obligation with a sukkah that is borrowed. For since he enters it with permission, it is considered as his own. "For yourselves," i.e., from your own, is mentioned only to exclude a sukkah which was stolen.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav[11] thus explains that a person must own the sukkah which he uses to fulfill his obligation. Nevertheless, a person may fulfill his obligation with a sukkah that is borrowed, because the sukkah's owner allows the borrower to consider it as his own.
The question thus arises: Why can't we use that same logic with regard to a lulav? Why is a borrowed lulav unacceptable?
It is possible to explain that there are various levels with regard to defining a person's ownership of an article. With regard to a lulav, it is required that the person's ownership be complete and outright. With regard to a sukkah, by contrast, one might say that all that is necessary is that the person have permission to use it; there is no obligation for him to have outright ownership over it.
[12]
This interpretation is not, however, reflected by the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch HaRav. On the contrary, the Shulchan Aruch HaRav states:[13]
A priori, a person should not dwell in a sukkah standing on land belonging to a colleague, for it is not actually called "his own," and the Torah said: "For yourselves," i.e., from your own. [Such a sukkah] does not resemble a sukkah that was borrowed... Since [a sukkah] was borrowed with [the owner's] permission, it is as if it is actually [the borrower's].
Thus the Shulchan Aruch HaRav considers a borrowed sukkah, not as a lesser degree of ownership, but rather as actually belonging to the owner. And thus we return to the question: Why is a borrowed lulav unacceptable?
It is possible to explain that the phrase "Every citizen..." is not coming to teach us that a lesser degree of ownership is acceptable, but rather to clarify why a borrowed sukkah is considered as if it actually belongs to the owner.
To explain: The mitzvah of dwelling in a sukkah involves considering the sukkah as one's permanent dwelling. Thus when a person lends his sukkah to a colleague, he is doing so with the intent that his colleague will regard it as his own in the most complete sense. For it is, for that immediate period, considered as his permanent dwelling. This is the very definition of the mitzvah, and it is only with such an intent that the mitzvah can be fulfilled. And therefore when a sukkah is borrowed with the owner's permission, it is taken for granted that the owner intended to give it to the borrower in a manner that it is "actually his."
With regard to a lulav, by contrast, the concept that a person must personally own the four species does not define the mitzvah itself. It is a requirement that must be met, but it is not an integral aspect of the mitzvah. Therefore, for a borrowed lulav to be acceptable on the first day of the holiday, the owner must make a specific stipulation that he is giving it to the recipient as a present to be returned.[14] This is not, in contrast to the law regarding a sukkah, a presumption one may take for granted.
The difference between the laws applying to a sukkah and a lulav reflect the spiritual qualities of these mitzvos. Both sukkah and lulav emphasize the unity of the Jewish people. The sukkah, however, underscores the general nature of that unity, that we share a common spiritual heritage. In essence, no Jew is separate from another Jew. And for this reason, "All of Israel are fit to dwell in a single sukkah." Extending this theme of oneness, a borrowed sukkah is considered as one's own, because this spiritual unity relates even to one's material possessions. It is only when a person's conduct runs contrary to this pattern, as in the instance of a stolen sukkah, when one's deeds create separation, that this motif does not apply.
The lulav, by contrast, highlights the unity of our people as each one exists within the context of his individual identity. Each of the four species stands for a different category of Jews, and the mitzvah involves bringing them together.[15] Nevertheless, since the emphasis is on every person's individual identity, when using a lulav belonging to a colleague, a stipulation must be made that it is being given as a present to be returned.
Notes:
- (Back to text) Sukkah 27b.
- (Back to text) Vayikra 23:40.
- (Back to text) Devarim 16:13.
- (Back to text) Vayikra 23:42.
- (Back to text) The Levush 637:2 explains that this concept is derived as follows: Although the word is read as sukkos, plural, it is written without a vav, which appears as a singular usage, indicating that "Every citizen..." will dwell in one sukkah.
- (Back to text) For it does not contribute to the literal meaning of the verse, and obviously is included for the purpose of exegesis.
- (Back to text) Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Lulav 8:10; Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 649:2); Shulchan Aruch HaRav 649:1.
- (Back to text) Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Sukkah 5:25; Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 637:2); Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:3.
- (Back to text) See the interpretation the Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 325, sec. 9) offers for Rashi's (Sukkah, loc. cit.) approach. This is also the approach of Tosafos (op. cit.).
- (Back to text) Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:3.
- (Back to text) Whose ruling is based on the interpretation of the Levush, loc. cit.
- (Back to text) See Avnei Miluim 28:43, Makor Chayim 448:9, and the Chasam Sofer (Orach Chayim, the conclusion of Responsum 180) which offer similar - but not exactly the same - explanations with regard to the requirement that a person own the sukkah he uses to fulfill the mitzvah.
- (Back to text) Shulchan Aruch HaRav 637:11.
- (Back to text) To cite another related instance: A person must own the four-cornered garment he is wearing to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis. If he borrows a garment from a colleague, he is obligated to recite a blessing, because we assume that the person who lent it to him lent it with the intent that he could fulfill the mitzvah (Shulchan Aruch HaRav 14:6; see also 14:8 and the Kuntres Acharon).
- (Back to text) See the essay entitled "The Unity of Our People" in Timeless Patterns in Time, Vol. I, p. 66, where this concept is explained.
Yom Kippur: Inspiring Atonement